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ABSTRACT
Climate change represents a global commons problem, where
individuals, businesses, and nation-states all lack sufficient incentives
to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to levels consistent with meet-
ing their collectively agreed upon mitigation goals. The current “pledge
and review” paradigm for global climate change mitigation, which many
see as a major breakthrough, relies primarily on moral pressure, repu-
tational incentives, and global public opinion to foster cooperation on
mitigation efforts over and above those driven by maximization of narrow
conceptions of national interests. Given the scale of the emissions reduc-
tions required to meet stated mitigation goals, the substantial economic
costs of deep decarbonization, and the central role of fossil fuels in the
global economy, these soft factors are likely to prove too weak. Projec-
tions based on the pledges embodied in the Paris Agreement indicate
that the world is not on a path to avoiding dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the global climate, and there is no enforcement mecha-
nism to assure that the commitments made in Paris are kept. These
limitations suggest the need for more robust mechanisms to encourage
adoption of emissions controls based on the full global costs they generate.
This Article discusses four possibilities: (1) strategic emissions abatement
policies; (2) linking climate change mitigation with other geopolitical issues,
with a particular emphasis on trade; (3) introduction of a globally harmo-
nized carbon price, with design features adjusted to induce reluctant
countries to participate; and (4) relaxation of national sovereignty in favor
of a sovereign global climate authority. Each of these options presents its
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own set of risks and challenges, but all must be considered in light of the
importance of achieving robust global coordination on climate change
mitigation and of the currently dim prospects for doing so.
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I. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF PLEDGE AND REVIEW
When the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (“UNFCCC”) was negotiated at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, it
was widely assumed that greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions would be
contained via a treaty that set binding limits on those emissions. The
UNFCCC also established a sharp division between developing countries
and the developed countries listed in Annexes I and II, with the primary
burden placed upon the latter.1 This was in recognition of the lower per
capita emissions of developing countries as well as the historical role of
developed countries in contributing to the existing stock of GHGs in the
1 Parties & Observers, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/items/2704.php [https://perma.cc/6MLR-RX3J]
(last visited Mar. 19, 2018).
2018] INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION 925
atmosphere.2 This division was enshrined in the UNFCCC’s principle of
“common but differentiated responsibilities.”3
At the third Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (“COP 3”)
in Kyoto in 1997, this principle was actualized in an agreement, the
Kyoto Protocol, that set specific and legally binding emissions targets for
developed countries. Developing countries were only required to report
their emissions.4 The absence of emissions reduction targets for develop-
ing countries in the Kyoto Protocol precluded its ratification by the United
States.5 In July 1997, during the run-up to COP 3, the U.S. Senate
passed the Byrd-Hagel Resolution by a vote of 95–0.6 The Resolution
indicated the
sense of the Senate that—the United States should not be
a signatory to any . . . agreement . . . which would man-
date new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas
emissions for the Annex I Parties, unless the protocol or
other agreement also mandates new specific scheduled
commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions
for Developing Country Parties within the same compli-
ance period[.]
While it is far from clear that the Senate would have ratified an alterna-
tive version of the Kyoto Protocol that imposed binding emissions com-
mitments on developing countries, the version that Vice President Gore
signed was dead on arrival and indeed was never even submitted to the
Senate for ratification.7
Nonetheless, the Kyoto Protocol did enter into force in February
2005, with its first commitment period running from 2008 through 2012.8
2 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 1, 1992, S. Treaty Doc.
102-38, I.L.M. 851, at preamble.
3 Id.
4 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
5 S. Res. 98, 105th Cong., at preamble (1997).
6 Id.
7 Frank Gaffney, Al Gore’s Climate Treaty—Dead On Arrival, CENTER FOR SECURITY POL-
ICY (Dec. 11, 1997), https://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/1997/12/11/al-gores-climate-treaty
-dead-on-arrival-2/ [https://perma.cc/J23F-WBWX].
8 Kyoto Protocol, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://
unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php [https://perma.cc/F2LD-YTFK] (last visited
Mar. 19, 2018).
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A second commitment period was agreed to under the Doha Amendment
in 2012, but the Doha Amendment never entered into force.9 The devel-
oped country parties to the Kyoto Protocol generally met their commit-
ments and the agreement very likely resulted in a net reduction in the
growth of global emissions when compared to a scenario where no treaty
was adopted. However, these reductions below business as usual were
fairly modest on the global scale.10 Moreover, as the growth of developing
country economies and GHG emissions in the intervening years made
clear, the basic framework of the Kyoto Protocol was incapable of achiev-
ing the deep emissions reductions required to stabilize atmospheric GHG
concentration at a level consistent with avoiding dangerous anthropogenic
climate change.11 Canada also withdrew as a party to Kyoto in December
2011 and suffered no apparent consequences, calling into question the
significance and value of a binding agreement.12
As frustration with the Kyoto approach grew, due both to the non-
participation of the United States and the inadequacy of any agreement
that does not include curbs on developing country emissions, policymakers
began searching for alternatives. Any new approach would need to ad-
dress the strong resistance among developing countries to having binding
emissions reductions imposed on them as well as the refusal of the U.S.
Senate to accept legally binding emissions limits that might harm the U.S.
economy, especially if developing countries do not face similar restrictions.
The result was a gradual shift, sparked by a Bush Administration proposal
in 2007, toward a “bottom-up,” voluntary, non-binding approach, often re-
ferred to as pledge and review, which calls for each country to choose its
own emissions goal and report back on its progress.13 Many climate
mitigation advocates see this as an important breakthrough and a more
viable path to achieving stabilization of atmospheric GHG concentrations
9 Status of the Doha Amendment, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/doha_amendments/items/7362.php [https://
perma.cc/SDG5-XAK7] (last visited Mar. 19, 2018).
10 WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2010: DEVELOPMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE
4, 79 (2010).
11 Id.
12 A Climate Change Plan for the Purposes of the Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act 2012:
Canada’s Withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol, ENV’T. & CLIMATE CHANGE CANADA, https://
www.ec.gc.ca/Publications/default.asp?lang=En&n=EE4F06AE-1&xml=EE4F06AE-13EF
-453B-B633-FCB3BAECEB4F&offset=3&toc=hide [https://perma.cc/97WX-WPK7] (last
visited Mar. 19, 2018).
13 Matt McGrath, Did Dubya help to save the world?, BBC NEWS (Dec. 15, 2015), http://
www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-35096475 [https://perma.cc/337B-H2BA].
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at a relatively safe level.14 This approach culminated in the Paris Agree-
ment adopted at COP 21 in December 2015.15 In October 2016, the
Agreement reached the ratification threshold of at least fifty-five UNFCCC
parties representing at least 55% of global GHG emissions. It entered
into force in November 2016.16
II. LIMITS OF VOLUNTARY MODEL
While the pledge and review approach has produced pledges of
greater emissions reduction (below business as usual) from more nations
than the Kyoto Protocol, it is inadequate to achieve the deep emissions
reductions required. Even the non-binding promises being made are
insufficient to achieve stabilization at a level that climate science tells us
is safe, and there is no legal obligation or enforcement mechanism to
ensure these reductions are achieved. Since most of the Nationally De-
termined Contributions (“NDCs”) in the Paris Agreement only extend to
2030, there is inevitable uncertainty in projecting the agreement’s impact
of temperature rise. However, credible estimates based on modelling of
future emissions trajectories project a temperature rise of around 2.7–3.7
degrees Celsius.17 The International Energy Agency’s World Energy Out-
look 2016 projected that under the Paris Agreement, global GHG emis-
sions would continue rising by 0.5% per year through 2040, using up the
entire carbon budget consistent with limiting temperature rise to two
degrees Celsius by the mid-2040s in their central scenario.18
14 Id.
15 The Paris Agreement, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php [https://perma.cc/QW8A-RG9P] (last
visited Mar. 19, 2018).
16 Id.
17 See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE: WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK
SPECIAL BRIEFING FOR COP21 4 (2015), https://www.iea.org/media/news/WEO_INDC
_Paper_Final_WEB.PDF [https://perma.cc/MTV8-WTXS]; Joeri Rogelj et al., Paris Agreement
climate proposals need a boost to keep warming well below 2 °C, 534 NATURE 631, 631
(2016); ALBAN KITOUS & KIMON KERAMIDAS, ANALYSIS OF SCENARIOS INTEGRATING THE
INDCS 2–3 (2015), https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/sites/jrcsh/files/JRC97845.pdf [https://perma
.cc/7LMX-H7CV]; U.N. ENVTL. PROGRAM, THE EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2015—EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY 2 (2015), http://uneplive.unep.org/media/docs/theme/13/EGR_2015_ES_Eng
lish_Embargoed.pdf [https://perma.cc/SDG9-F4VK]; CLIMATE ACTION TRACKER, http://
www.climateactiontracker.org/ [https://perma.cc/L4P4-2NGS] (last visited Mar. 19, 2018).
18 INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, FACT SHEET: WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2016 (2016), https://www
.iea.org/media/publications/weo/WEO2016Factsheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/63CQ-MJMF].
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For context, stabilization of atmospheric GHGs at any level will
ultimately require a reduction of global emissions to match the earth’s
natural capacity to remove GHGs from the atmosphere. That capacity is
approximately 5 Gt CO2e per year,
19 just over 10% of 2010’s 49 Gt CO2e
emissions.20 Stabilizing at the relatively modest goal of 550 ppm CO2e,
corresponding to a projected temperature rise of three degrees Celsius,
would require global emissions to peak by 2025 and then fall by at least
1–3% every year.21 A 25% reduction below 2005 levels would have to be
achieved around 2050.22 If emissions peak later, more rapid reductions
would be required to achieve the same stabilization goal. If emissions
peak too late or too high, the stock of
GHGs would grow to exceed the stabilization target, requiring
reductions below 5 Gt CO2e per year to eventually restore GHG concen-
trations to the target.23 The same result would occur if post-peak emis-
sions cuts are not made fast enough.24 A number of scenarios, based on
a stabilization goal of 550 ppm CO2e, are illustrated below.
25
19 NICHOLAS STERN, STERN REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 291 (2007). This
statement assumes that we do not implement geoengineering measures that remove
GHGs from the atmosphere. If this kind of geoengineering is employed, the relevant metric
becomes net anthropogenic emissions (anthropogenic emissions minus the quantity of
GHGs removed by human activity), which still must be brought down to 5 GT CO2e.
Geoengineering approaches that mitigate warming without removing GHGs would not
alter the stabilizing emissions rate, though they might have the potential to make stabili-
zation unnecessary.
20 IPCC, SUMMARY FOR POLICY MAKERS 6 (2014), https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-re
port/ar5/wg3/ipcc_wg3_ar5_summary-for-policymakers.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CGG-Y2VR]
[hereinafter IPCC SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS].
21 STERN, supra note 19, at 193.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 200–01.
24 Id. at 193, 199–201.
25 Id. at 199. The figure is from Stern’s Figure 8.2, and was generated using the SiMCaP
EQW model (Meinshausen et al. 2006).
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Defenders of the pledge and review paradigm contend that future
rounds of NDCs will grow in ambition as countries compete with each
other, which will generate a positive feedback loop. Similarly, some argue
that the transparency provisions will facilitate a “name and shame”
dynamic that will compel parties to ramp up their commitments. I cer-
tainly hope this transpires, but there are reasons to be skeptical. At a
basic level, climate change is a global commons problem.26 For most
countries, the impact of their own emissions on the magnitude of climate
change impacts they will experience is negligible, since they are only
responsible for a small fraction of global emissions.27 Even for the largest
emitters, like the United States and China, most of the benefits from
reducing their emissions accrue to the rest of the world.28 That is, there
26 Peter H. Howard & Jason A. Schwartz, Think Global: International Reciprocity as
Justification for a Global Social Cost of Carbon 13 (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law & Inst. for Policy
Integrity, Working Paper No. 3, 2016), http://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/Global
_Social_Cost_of_Carbon_Reciprocity.pdf [https://perma.cc/JH6L-JVWA].
27 Id.
28 Id.
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is a substantial divergence between the domestic and global social costs
of carbon.29 This creates an incentive structure where, all else being
equal, it is in the interest of every country to free ride and let others bear
the burden of climate change mitigation.30
This situation stands in contrast to the problem of ozone depletion
due to chlorofluorocarbon (“CFC”) emissions, for which steep unilateral
emissions cuts would have produced large net benefits for most parties
to the Montreal Protocol.31 In game theory terms, ozone depletion pre-
sented a “no-conflict” game where phasing out CFCs was the dominant
strategy for most countries.32 In the climate change context, some margin
of GHG emissions reductions will be cheap enough and/or produce
sufficient co-benefits to pass a domestic cost-benefit test, regardless of
how other countries respond, but these reductions will not aggregate to
anything close to what is needed to prevent dangerous climate change.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Fifth Assessment
Report, for instance, estimates that adoption of the most cost-effective
policies to keep atmospheric CO2e concentrations at or below 450 parts
per million would reduce global consumption growth by 0.06% per year,
leading to a fall below trend consumption of 1.7% by 2030, 3.4% by 2050,
and 4.8% by 2100.33
There is substantial uncertainty in these estimates, in large part
because they depend on assumptions regarding technological develop-
ment.34 But it would be unwise to simply hope that technological break-
throughs will prove an adequate substitute for a robust policy regime. If
anything, the political challenges associated with adopting the most cost-
effective policies like carbon pricing suggest that actual costs are likely
to be higher. While these costs are certainly manageable and worth bearing
given the costs and risks associated with climate change, they are sub-
stantial enough that getting countries to bear them will be a significant
geopolitical challenge. In order to justify deep emissions reductions, the
29 Id. at 4.
30 LIAM O’FLAHERTY, UNIV. COLL. LONDON: GLOB. GOVERNANCE INST., THE GLOBAL GOVERN-
ANCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 4 (2015), https://www.ucl.ac.uk/global-governance/downloads
/policybriefs/climatechangebrief [https://perma.cc/HRY3-2B2Z].
31 Cass R. Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 1, 17–19 (2007).
32 Stephen J. DeCanio & Anders Fremstad, Game theory and climate diplomacy, 85 ECO-
LOGICAL ECON. 177, 179 (2011).
33 IPCC SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, supra note 20, at 15–16.
34 Id. at 6.
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impact of those emissions on other countries must be factored, directly
or indirectly, into the decision-making process. The theory of pledge and
review is that moral pressure, reputational incentives, and global public
opinion will be sufficient to motivate action. There is no precedent for
such forces inducing countries to bear the sort of large economic burden
that deep climate change mitigation calls for.
Against this skeptical view, advocates of the pledge and review
approach can surely claim that it has been more successful than any-
thing else we have tried, and that the Paris Agreement it produced is a
big step toward putting the world on a path that will eventually lead to
deep enough emissions reductions to avoid dangerous climate change.
Although the emissions commitments through 2030 do not adhere to the
most cost effective path to climate stabilization, they represent a political
breakthrough and an important step toward the stabilization goal.
Commitments for 2030 can still be improved upon in interim reviews and
will create momentum for steeper reductions in subsequent commitment
periods.35 Indeed, Article 3(4) of the Paris Agreement requires that every
five years, “each Party’s successive nationally determined contribution
will represent a progression beyond the Party’s then current nationally
determined contribution and reflect its highest possible ambition.”36
Extrapolating out from the NDCs embodied in the Paris agreement to
model temperature change also assumes no further breakthroughs in the
international negotiations. All such analysis shows is that the Paris
Agreement did not entirely solve the climate mitigation problem, but this
is an unfair standard because it was never realistic to expect the problem
to be solved in one giant leap. If the theory behind pledge and review is
sound, we would expect to see, over time, that the projections based on
successive rounds of pledges will bring us closer to the temperature goal
of the Paris Agreement.37
There are a few problems with this more optimistic analysis.
First, the current NDCs embodied in the Paris Agreement could just as
easily be viewed as a best case scenario for emissions, since there is no
enforcement mechanism to ensure that countries meet their targets.
Indeed, early evidence suggests that developing countries are falling
35 KITOUS & KERAMIDAS, supra note 17, at 4.
36 Paris Agreement art. 4, ¶ 3, Dec. 12, 2015, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/Add.1, http://unf
ccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/application/pdf/english_paris_agreement
.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8L2-B745].
37 Based on email correspondence with Joseph Siegel, Senior Attorney in EPA Region 2 and
Adjunct Professor at Pace University’s Elizabeth Haub School of Law, on file with author.
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short of their Paris pledges.38 With the election of Donald Trump and the
likely repeal of the Clean Power Plan, it already looks implausible that
the United States will meet its Paris commitments.39 Under Obama
Administration policies, the United States “was probably only ever on
track to cut its emissions by 15–19%” below 2005 levels by 2025, well
short of the 26–28% pledge.40 The June 2017 announcement of U.S.
withdrawal from the Paris Agreement casts further doubt on its viability.
Moreover, as the low-hanging fruit of cheap41 emissions reductions are
plucked between now and 2030, further reductions will require more
costly tradeoffs, at least in the absence of significant technological break-
throughs.42 It is unrealistic to expect that all or nearly all significant
emitters will be prepared to make significant economic sacrifices on the
sole basis of concern for the welfare of non-citizens or their reputations
as positive contributors to the international system. Evidence from other
domains of international affairs strongly suggests that nations act pri-
marily in their own interests and that global interests are only served
when the incentive structure facing states compels it.43 Foreign aid, for
example, represents a relatively small fraction of government budgets
and much of it is designed to serve security interests or other objectives
that ultimately benefit domestic citizens.44 Likewise, immigration and
trade policy decisions typically place little to no weight on the interests
38 David G. Victor et al., Comment, Prove Paris was more than paper promises, 548 NATURE
25, 26 (2017), https://www.nature.com/polopoly_fs/1.22378!/menu/main/topColumns/top
LeftColumn/pdf/548025a.pdf [https://perma.cc/X67D-KECE].
39 Emily Atkin, The Paris Agreement Is Burning, NEW REPUBLIC (Mar. 28, 2017), https://
newrepublic.com/article/141640/paris-agreement-burning-trump-executive-order-obama
-clean-power-plan [https://perma.cc/C3EA-XRB4].
40 Victor et al., supra note 38, at 26.
41 “Cheap” should be read here to refer to net costs, such that moderate cost interventions
that produce significant local co-benefits qualify. The existence of local co-benefits is often
raised as a counter to the fundamental incentive logic of atmospheric commons. These
co-benefits do allow for some margin of emissions abatement measures to pass a domestic
cost-benefit analysis, but not nearly enough to meet the world’s stated climate stabilization
goals. The role of international climate mitigation institutions should be to fill that gap.
42 Victor et al., supra note 38, at 26.
43 JOSHUA S. GOLDSTEIN & JON C. PEVEHOUSE, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 4–9 (Pearson
8th ed. 2008), available at http://www.joshuagoldstein.com/jgcore.htm [https://perma.cc
/54MQ-YRPS].
44 See OECD, Net Official Development Assistance From DAC and Other Donors in 2014
(Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/documentupload/ODA%202014%20Tables
%20and%20Charts.pdf [https://perma.cc/5TBU-7EZZ]; CURT TARNOFF & LARRY NOWELS,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ORDER CODE 98-916, FOREIGN AID: AN INTRODUCTORY OVERVIEW
OF U.S. PROGRAMS AND POLICY 1–3 (2005).
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of foreigners. In fact, George Mason University economist Bryan Caplan
argues that voters’ systematic “tendency to underestimate the economic
benefits of interaction with foreigners” leads democracies to adopt trade
and immigration policies that are less open and cooperative than an
unbiased optimization of domestic interests would produce.45
The international trade system works, to the extent that it does,
because countries that do not participate constructively are the primary
malificiaries of their actions. Other countries lose out a little bit from
having one fewer trading partner, but the economically isolated country
suffers much more. In fact, economic theory suggests that unilateral
lowering of trade barriers would produce net benefits for most countries
that adopt it.46 The primary barrier to free trade is domestic politics,
where the concentrated interests of producers who benefit from tariffs
and other forms of protectionism are better organized than the diffuse
interests of consumers who would benefit from the lower prices gener-
ated by international competition. Free trade agreements and the World
Trade Organization overcome these obstacles by enabling coordination
of reciprocal lowering of trade barriers, which creates concentrated
constituencies for free trade in the form of domestic industries that
would benefit from access to foreign markets.47
The dynamic for climate policymakers is much more challenging.
A lone defector from a robust and aggressive global GHG emissions
reductions effort would get to enjoy the same climate change mitigation
benefits as all the participating countries, while bearing none of the
costs. Defectors might even get extra benefits from cheap access to fossil
fuels that others are phasing out or a competitive edge in energy intensive
export industries. Countries do not need to be coerced into participating
in the global trade system, because they are the primary beneficiaries of
their own openness. No analogous automatic reward system, beyond good-
will and reputational benefits, exists to encourage robust participation
in climate change mitigation, at least not beyond the level justified by co-
benefits of GHG emissions abatements measures or by domestic climate
change impacts attributable to domestic emissions. The challenge for
climate policymakers is to craft a set of instruments and institutions that
45 BRYAN CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER: WHY DEMOCRACIES CHOOSE BAD
POLICIES 36–39 (Princeton U. Press 2007).
46 Paul Krugman, What Should Trade Negotiators Negotiate About?, 35 J. OF ECON. LIT.
113, 113 (1997).
47 Id. at 119–20.
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will shape an incentive structure that is compatible with the deep GHG
emissions reductions needed to avoid dangerous climate change.
III. ALTERNATIVES AND SUPPLEMENTS TO PLEDGE AND REVIEW
The remainder of this Article discusses four potential mechanisms
for introducing these incentives into the climate mitigation regime. Each
mechanism presents significant hurdles and drawbacks, but all must be
given serious consideration in light of the importance of achieving suffi-
cient global coordination on climate change mitigation and the dim pros-
pects for doing so within the current paradigm. First, I consider strategic
emissions abatement policies, including explicitly conditioning emissions
commitments on the emissions of other countries and various emissions
abatement coalition arrangements. Second, I discuss linkage of climate
change mitigation with other geopolitical issues, with a particularly em-
phasis on trade. Third, I describe a globally harmonized carbon price
regime, with design features and transfer payments used to induce re-
luctant countries to participate. Finally, I analyze the potential for re-
laxation of national sovereignty in the climate change mitigation domain
in favor of a sovereign global climate authority empowered to enforce
emissions regulations.
A. Strategic Emissions Abatement Policies
One option, pushing the analogy with trade to its limit, would be
for countries to explicitly condition their emissions reduction pledges on
the emissions of others, ramping up their own mitigation efforts in reci-
procity with others’ efforts. One proposal along these lines is for a strategic
social cost of carbon (“SCC”), distinct from domestic and global concep-
tions of the SCC.48 Using the SCC or a carbon price as the benchmark
has two advantages over traditional approaches based on national aggre-
gate emissions targets. First, it offers a neutral principle for determining
the level of climate mitigation effort each country should undertake and
acts as a transparent metric, reducing the scope for special pleading with
regard to circumstances and capacities. Transfer payments or other
concessions could still be used to compensate countries with especially
48 The social cost of carbon is a monetized present value estimate of the long-term harm
produced by a ton of carbon dioxide. It is used to estimate the benefits of emissions reduc-
tions policies in regulatory cost-benefit analysis.
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high mitigation costs and/or low vulnerability to climate impacts, or to
address moral culpability for unequal contributions to the existing stock
of GHGs in the atmosphere. Second, a uniform global SCC or carbon
price would help ensure that the most cost effective emissions abatement
measures are undertaken first, regardless of their geographic location or
legal jurisdiction. If it is more cost effective to invest in clean infrastruc-
ture from the start in developing countries than to replace existing dirty
infrastructure in industrialized countries, for instance, then those invest-
ments should be prioritized. Ideally, the question of which abatement
measures to undertake could be separated from the issue of who bears
the costs of implementing them.
Yale environmental economist Matthew Kotchen introduces the
strategic SCC concept and develops a game theory model where strategic
carbon emissions behavior depends upon assumptions regarding the re-
sponse of other countries to domestic emissions reductions.49 Under certain
assumptions and conditions, he shows that it can be individually rational
for countries to internalize the global SCC.50 Unfortunately, Kotchen
ends up defining strategic SCC in terms of the “level of global ambition
each country would like to see through a uniformly applied marginal cost
on emissions,” in effect assuming away most of the key strategic prob-
lems and focusing only on differences in vulnerability to climate im-
pacts.51 He finds that the strategic SCC, so defined, will always be higher
than the domestic SCC and can be higher or lower than the global SCC,
depending on the relative vulnerability of the country to the impacts of
climate change.52 Highly vulnerable countries may have strategic SCC
above the global SCC, since it is in their interest to nudge the global
carbon price toward a higher equilibrium closer to a level that maximizes
their net benefits. Less vulnerable countries, by contrast, will prefer an
equilibrium where the global carbon price rests below the global SCC.
Kotchen implicitly justifies this approach based on his demonstra-
tion that SCC set above their domestic values are present in subgame
perfect equilibria in repeated games with infinite or uncertain duration,
but he fails to demonstrate that any one country’s adoption of a higher
SCC will succeed in nudging the world to higher SCC equilibrium. Indeed,
49 Matthew J. Kotchen, Which Social Cost of Carbon? A Theoretical Perspective 1 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 22246, 2016), http://papers.nber.org/tmp/45831
-w22246.pdf [https://perma.cc/D266-JYNT].
50 Id. at 14.
51 Id. at 19.
52 Id. at 20.
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in the context of non-repeated games, he acknowledges that results where
countries adopt SCC above their domestic values depend on contested
conjectural assumptions regarding responses to one country increasing
its SCC value.53 In fact, some game theory models find that greater
emissions reductions by one country will induce others to raise their emis-
sions by lowering the marginal damage induced by those emissions.54
Scholarly analyses of carbon leakage also discuss a potential slacking-off
effect, where the perception or reality that other jurisdictions are adopt-
ing strong measures to reduce emissions could reduce the sense of ur-
gency on climate action for other parties.55 To Kotchen’s credit, he does
offer some reason to think that the pure, non-repeated game Nash be-
havior embodied in these models is unrealistic and also does not claim
that the models he presents are necessarily the correct ones.56 Nonethe-
less, his failure to incorporate the key strategic elements of climate
change mitigation into his conception of the strategic SCC limits the
utility of his approach.
A more robust conception of the strategic SCC would be sensitive
to the actual patterns of international response to changes in domestic
climate policy. It would also allow explicitly and publicly conditioning the
SCC value used on the emissions behavior of other countries. After all,
the models where equilibria with SCC set above domestic levels are
stable depend on the threat of retaliation for defection, among other
features. Accordingly, a SCC that is insensitive to the emissions behavior
of other countries would undermine strategic leverage. Linking the SCC
or carbon price to the emissions policies adopted by other jurisdictions
would also address the objection of domestic opponents of GHG emissions
abatement measures in the United States: that unilateral action will
have negligible impact on the global climate and so does not pass a cost-
benefit test.57 Unfortunately, even if many countries implemented a
conditional SCC strategy, there remains a similar commons problem to
53 Id. at 15.
54 Peter John Wood, Climate Change and Game Theory 8 (Envtl. Econ. Res. Hub, Res.
Report No. 62, 2010), http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/95061/2/Climate%20Change
%20and%20Game%20Theory.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LVL-T9ZJ].
55 Daniel A. Farber, Carbon Leakage Versus Policy Diffusion: The Perils and Promise of
Subglobal Climate Action, 13 CHI. J. INT’L. L. 359, 373 (2013).
56 Kotchen, supra note 49, at 15.
57 See Jerry Taylor, Debating Carbon Taxes with Oren Cass (and Bill Gates), NISKANEN
CTR. (Apr. 19, 2017), https://niskanencenter.org/blog/debating-carbon-taxes-oren-cass-bill
-gates/ [https://perma.cc/9ZHB-VG8F].
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the original situation. SCC value adjustments made to punish or reward
GHG emissions policy actions by other governments will impose similar
consequences on all countries, regardless of their own emissions policies.58
When considering how much to invest in mitigation, these countries will
have some incentive to consider the impact of their emissions on the
emissions of countries that adopt conditional emissions policies. However,
given the large number of countries with significant GHG emissions, the
sensitivity of conditional emissions policies to emissions behavior of any
one country will be limited. Conditional emissions policies may have their
greatest impact on the behavior of large emitters like the United States
and China, whose own policy changes would have outsized impact on
conditional emissions response functions. Of course, the greater potential
emissions reductions in the United States and China also correlate to
higher aggregate costs for greater policy ambition (e.g., higher SCC or
carbon price), so the scaled-up incentives may still fail to shift domestic
cost-benefit analyses significantly. Frequent adjustments in SCC values
or carbon prices in response to the emissions behavior of others may also
render mitigation policies less economically efficient. There is some risk
with any conditional emissions abatement policies that the additional
emissions reductions induced in other countries will be insufficient to
offset any reduction in ambition by the countries who establish and execute
conditional emissions policies. Nonetheless, this approach is worthy of
consideration as part of a broader effort to align mitigation incentives.
One proposal to increase the strategic leverage of conditional
abatement policies is to form a top-down grand coalition where all coun-
tries adopt a globally optimal SCC if and only if all other countries join
the coalition.59 If any country defects, the coalition dissolves and all coun-
tries revert to their domestic SCC. If the commitment to dissolve the
coalition in response to a single defection is credible, this structure can
be shown to produce optimal emissions reductions given otherwise reason-
able assumptions. Unfortunately, there is reason to doubt the credibility
of such an approach, since most of the cost of dissolving the coalition would
fall on members rather than the initial defector.60 It is also vulnerable to
being undone by the defection of an irrational actor or one that does not
recognize the anticipated costs associated with climate change. Do we
58 The consequences will not be exactly the same because of differential vulnerabilities to
climate change, but the key point is that the impacts will not be targeted in any systematic
way on to the countries that are being “punished” for their own lax emissions standards.
59 Wood, supra note 54, at 20–21.
60 Id. at 21.
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really want the success of climate mitigation to depend on the full cooper-
ation of North Korea or the Trump Administration? Moreover, any excep-
tions to the dissolution commitment that are allowed in order to address
this problem risk further undermining the credibility of the commitment.
Intermediate approaches based on bottom-up coalitions are also
possible. If several countries agree to adopt SCC that maximize their
joint welfare, the coalition’s optimal SCC will rise in proportion to the
share of global emissions contained within the coalition.61 As the coali-
tion expands to include all countries, the coalition’s optimal SCC ap-
proaches the global SCC. Unfortunately, both theoretical models and
empirical results indicate that bottom-up coalitions for the provision of
global public goods tend be small, unstable, and fragile, at least absent
external enforcement mechanisms. The problem is that as more coun-
tries join, the optimal SCC for the group rises and diverges further from
the domestic SCC of its members. This increases the incentive for indi-
vidual members to defect and free-ride off the efforts of remaining coali-
tion members. This defection would marginally reduce optimal SCC for
those remaining, but at sufficiently large coalition size this will not
produce defection costs larger than the benefits of reverting to the defec-
tor’s domestic SCC.62 The size of sustainable coalitions depends on the
structure of mitigation costs and anticipated climate impacts as well as
the total number of countries, but the general result is that only in
relatively small coalitions can self-enforcement be robust.63
Despite these limitations, strategic leveraging of domestic mitiga-
tion policy can provide some added incentive for other countries to adopt
and follow through on more aggressive mitigation measures. In this
regard, the intransigence of the United States Congress has been partic-
ularly unhelpful, since it has limited U.S. federal climate mitigation
policy largely to executive actions under the Clean Air Act that lack the
flexibility necessary to be used as a tool to induce other countries to
reduce their emissions. This is particularly frustrating given that one of
the stated objections of Republican opponents of climate change mitiga-
tion legislation is that U.S. action, absent similar contributions from
China and other developing countries, would impose economic harm for
little benefit.64 Adopting a SCC or carbon price index to a basket of
61 William Nordhaus, Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free-riding in International Climate
Policy, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 1339, 1345 (2015).
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 See Rebecca Kaplana & Ellen Uchimiyacbs, Where the 2016 Republican candidates stand
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estimates of shadow carbon prices in other jurisdictions would address
objections based on the impotence of unilateral emissions abatement, while
providing other jurisdictions with some incentive to increase the strin-
gency of their own policies. By limiting the executive branch to the tools
available under the Clean Air Act and other statutes that were not drafted
with climate change mitigation in mind, Congress exacerbates this prob-
lem, in addition to preventing the use of more economically efficient
emissions reduction policies like carbon pricing.
B. Issue Linkage
The limitations of coalition formation absent external enforce-
ment measures suggests the necessity of linking climate change mitiga-
tion with other geopolitical issues, potentially including trade, collective
security arrangements, arms sales, access to research and development,
immigration, and foreign aid. This approach allows the option of target-
ing particular countries with incentives that are directly responsive to
their own behavior. Trade is the most promising candidate for linkage
and the primary focus of this section. Subsection 1 examines William
Nordhaus’s proposal for a “climate club” model for trade linkage. Subsec-
tion 2 considers the potential role of carbon tariffs or border tax adjust-
ments for imports of energy intensive goods. Subsection 3 analyzes the
legality of trade linkage under the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade and under World Trade Organization jurisprudence. Subsection
4 explores the potential for more generally integrating climate change
mitigation into diplomatic relations, using a range of other policy do-
mains as potential carrots and sticks to motivate ambitious GHG emis-
sions abatement measures. Finally, subsection 5 discusses the risks and
limitations of issue linkage.
1. Climate Club
Yale environmental economist William Nordhaus characterizes
trade-linking as “the only serious candidate” for introducing enforcement
mechanisms to climate agreements, proposing formation of a “climate
club” of countries that agree to adopt a minimum domestic carbon price
and impose tariffs on countries that do not participate.65 Use of a carbon
on climate change, CBS NEWS (Sept. 1, 2015), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/where-the
-2016-republican-candidates-stand-on-climate-change/ [https://perma.cc/8FHN-WJ3L].
65 WILLIAM NORDHAUS, THE CLIMATE CASINO: RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND ECONOMICS FOR
A WARMING WORLD 255 (Yale U. Press 2013).
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price requirement as opposed to an emissions limit allows for a single-
dimensional metric of ambition. Nordhaus argues that this will make the
coalition more stable by reducing the risk of “stab-in-the-back” instabil-
ity, where coalition members or subgroups hold out or defect in hopes of
garnering more favorable terms.66 He does not address the possibility
that the requirement that all participants adopt carbon pricing might
threaten the domestic political viability of the approach in some coun-
tries, including the United States. Domestic political resistance to carbon
pricing could prove an insurmountable obstacle to successful adoption of
Nordhaus’s approach. One way of addressing this could be to allow sub-
stitution of a shadow carbon price in the form of a pervasive regulatory
regime based on a SCC.67 Whether a given SCC value for regulatory
analysis can be feasibly and verifiably made equivalent to a carbon price
is an open question and beyond the scope of this paper.
Nordhaus describes two different approaches to trade-linking: a
uniform tariff on all imports from non-club countries or a border tax adjust-
ment based on the carbon content of imports, also known as a carbon tariff,
that imposes the agreed upon minimum carbon price. While the border tax
adjustment approach has received more scholarly attention, Nordhaus
favors a uniform tariff as a simpler and more transparent approach. He
points out that most GHG emissions come from non-tradable sectors like
power plants and transportation, which would not be affected by a border
tax adjustment.68 Accordingly, the function of trade-linking should be to
provide inducements to adopt more robust emissions reductions policies,
rather than directly targeting trade in carbon-intensive goods.
66 Nordhaus, supra note 61, at 1347.
67 WORLD BANK, Pricing Carbon: What is Carbon Pricing (Jan. 17, 2017), http://www.world
bank.org/en/programs/pricing-carbon [https://perma.cc/PS3A-T996].
68 Nordhaus, supra note 61, at 1348.
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Nordhaus develops a model with 15 regions, simulating outcomes
for target carbon prices (global SCC) ranging from $12.5 to $100/tCO2.
The results are presented in the table below69:
At $12.5/tCO2, a 1% tariff is sufficient to induce full participation in
the club. At $25/tCO2, a 2% tariff induces 14 of 15 regions to participate,
with a 3% tariff needed to attain full participation. At $50/tCO2, a 5%
tariff achieves near-total cooperation. At $100/tCO2, a 10% tariff is
needed to induce even half the regions to join the club.70 Effectively, this
means that a carbon club is unlikely to be able to sustain a carbon price
much above $50/tCO2. In Nordhaus’s model, a $12.5/tCO2 carbon price
with full participation reduces emissions by 9% below baseline, rising to
18%, 36%, and 72% at $25, $50, and $100/tCO2, respectively, assuming
static technology.71 This indicates that substantial technological progress
would be necessary to bring marginal abatement costs down enough for
the level of carbon prices sustainable under a climate club to achieve the
needed emissions reductions.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 1357–58.
71 Id. at 1358.
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There is also reason to think that Nordhaus’s model presents an
optimistic scenario. First, Nordhaus’s model relies on the assumption
that club members benefit directly from the tariffs they impose on non-
members. For instance, his model assumes that United States would
garner $23 billion in net benefits from imposing a 2% tariff on all im-
ports.72 The table below displays these benefits, as well as the magnitude
of the climate externality (global SCC minus domestic SCC), and the
costs of being the sole non-participant for a global SCC of 25/tCO2 and 2%
tariff for 6 of the 15 countries/regions he models73:
In assuming these benefits to tariff-imposing countries, Nordhaus
relies on the theory of optimal tariffs, under which large economies with
market power can benefit from the imposition of fees on imports and
exports that enable them to achieve more favorable terms of trade.74 In
the appendix to his Climate Club paper, he discusses a model developed
by Ralph Ossa that estimates optimal tariff rates and finds a central
72 Id. at 1350.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 1353.
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estimate of 60%, well in excess of the tariff rates his proposal entails.75
However, these results are controversial, with some prominent econo-
mists dismissing optimal tariff theory as “little more than an intellectual
curiosity with no practical value in all but the largest countries.”76 This
relates to the other main reason to be skeptical of the output of
Nordhaus’s model, that he consolidates the world into 15 countries and
regional blocs instead of 193 countries. In optimal tariff theory, small
countries lack the market power to substantially improve their terms of
trade by imposing tariffs. Moreover, the basic dynamics of coalition
formation for the provision of public goods become more challenging as
the number of countries rises, suggesting that real-world results would
underperform relative to the Nordhaus model.77 There is also evidence
that existing tariff rates already take advantage of the best opportunities
to exercise market power, setting higher tariff rates for goods that are
supplied inelastically.78 This suggests that there may be limited scope for
further exercise of market power, on which Nordhaus’s case rests. It is
also worth noting that optimal tariff theory implies corresponding terms
of trade benefits from taxing exports.79 While the domestic politics of this
would be challenging, there would be greater scope for implementing this
policy under existing international trade law.
The assumption of net benefits to tariff-imposing countries is
particularly critical to Nordhaus’s model because that is what renders
the trade sanctions incentive compatible. If instead trade sanctions were
costly to the imposing countries as well as the sanctioned countries, as
is typical with the more severe economic sanctions used in coercive
diplomacy, the entire structure would be at greater risk of unraveling.
Optimal tariff theory also relies on holding the tariff policies of other
countries constant. If punitive tariffs imposed by members of a climate
club set off a trade war, this would quickly wipe out any benefits from
improved terms of trade and make all countries worse off. To his credit,
Nordhaus does acknowledge the need for changes to international trade
law to accommodate his proposal.80 Even if the carbon club countries
75 WILLIAM NORDHAUS, ONLINE APPENDIX TO “THE CLIMATE CLUB: DESIGNING A MECHANISM
TO OVERCOME FREE RIDING IN INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY” 6–7 (2015).
76 Christian Broda et al., Optimal Tariffs: The Evidence 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res Work-
ing Paper No. 12033, 2006) (citing PAUL R. KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBTSFELD, INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMICS: THEORY AND POLICY 225, 245 (Addison-Wesley 4th ed. 1997)).
77 Nordhaus, supra note 61, at 1352.
78 Broda et al., supra note 76, at 1.
79 KRUGMAN & OBSTFELD, supra note 76, at 225.
80 Nordhaus, supra note 61, at 1349.
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could be confident that international trade law backed up their right to
impose punitive tariffs on outliers, however, the risk of rebellion against
World Trade Organization (“WTO”) rules by those outliers would have to
be factored into the expected benefits calculation for each club member,
potentially turning that value negative for marginal members.
Nonetheless, Nordhaus’s work does suggest that across-the-board
tariffs implemented through a climate club structure could be a powerful
tool for promoting cooperation on relatively aggressive climate change
mitigation measures. Other game theory models also support the basic
finding that trade sanctions can increase participation in a climate
treaty.81 Even though there is a clear limit, around a carbon price of
$50/ton, to the level of effort this approach can enforce, it would put the
world in a position where it is realistic that technological advances will
help deliver steep enough emissions reductions to stabilize atmospheric
GHG concentrations and temperatures at tolerable levels. It would be a
significant blow to the framework if tariffs imposed by a club member do
not produce the projected domestic benefits, but it is still possible a
critical mass of motivated countries could get the project off the ground.
Doing so would rely on a certain amount of domestic sacrifice for the sake
of tackling a global problem, but not nearly to the same extent as the
current pledge and review paradigm.
2. Carbon Tariffs or Border Tax Adjustments
As Nordhaus points out, tariffs on the carbon content of imported
goods are typically proposed as measures to address leakage and compet-
itiveness concerns. While the theoretical case for leakage is solid, esti-
mates of its magnitude tend be modest, with about 10% of emissions
reductions being offset by induced emissions elsewhere.82 Moreover, border
tax adjustments would only address trade-based leakage that occurs
when production of energy intensive manufactured goods is relocated,
81 Scott Barrett, The Strategy of Trade Sanctions in International Environmental Agree-
ments, 19 RES. & ENER. ECON. 345, 345 (1997); Kai Lessmann et al., The effects of tariffs on
coalition formation in a dynamic global warming game, 26 ECON. MOD. 641, 647 (2009).
82 Sallie James, A Harsh Climate for Trade: How Climate Change Proposals Threaten Global
Commerce 3 (Cato Inst., Trade Policy Analysis No. 41, 2009); Sergey v. Paltsev, The Kyoto
Protocol: Regional and Sectoral Contributions to the Carbon Leakage, 44 ENERGY J. 53, 53
(2001); WARWICK J. MCKIBBIN ET AL., EMISSIONS TRADING, CAPITAL FLOWS AND THE KYOTO
PROTOCOL 18 (Brookings Institution 1999); IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: MITIGATION:
SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 11 (2001).
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not consumption-based leakage in non-tradable sectors like grid electric-
ity and transportation. Unless accompanied by subsidies for energy
intensive exports, carbon tariffs also fail to address leakage associated
with reduced manufacturing exports. For these reasons, the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency estimates indicate that border tax adjustments
would reduce the increase in foreign emissions from unilateral emissions
policies by less than 5%.83 This means that border tax adjustments would
only reduce foreign emissions by about one ton for every two hundred
tons of domestic emissions avoided by the underlying emissions policy.84
Nonetheless, border tax adjustments are worth exploring for two
reasons. First, they are more likely to pass muster under current WTO
law than across-the-board tariffs. Second, they may make stronger
emissions reductions measures politically viable by mollifying domestic
manufacturers of energy-intensive tradable goods. Indeed, despite the
rhetorical nods to combating leakage, border tax adjustments are pro-
jected to be far more successful at maintaining domestic manufacturing
output than at reducing emissions.85 To understand why this is, it’s
important to recognize that what a border tax adjustment does is par-
tially shift emissions regulation from domestic production to domestic
consumption. This is easiest to see with an economy-wide carbon price.
If all imports are charged a border fee that matches the taxes or allow-
ance fees that would have been paid if produced domestically, then all
domestic consumption is on equal footing. Completing the shift from
supply- to demand-side regulation would entail refunding any carbon
fees for exports, so domestic exporters would be on the same level as
83 EPA, EPA ANALYSIS OF THE LIEBERMAN-WARNER CLIMATE SECURITY ACT OF 2008: S.
2191 IN 110TH CONGRESS 84 (Mar. 14, 2008), https://archive.epa.gov/epa/sites/produc
tion/files/2016-07/documents/s2191_epa_analysis.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7P3-RLZ6].
84 For a more in-depth discussion of emissions leakage and proposed countermeasures,
see Gabriel Weil, Costs, Contributions, and Climate Change: How Important Are Universal
Emissions Commitments?, 23 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 321 (2011).
85 Paul-Erik Veel, Carbon Tariffs and the WTO: An Evaluation of Feasible Policies, 12 J.
INT’L ECON. L. 749, 751–52 (2009); Michael McKenzie, Climate ‘Change and the Generalized
System of Preferences, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 679, 681 (2008); Carolyn Fischer & Alan K. Fox,
Comparing Policies to Combat Emissions Leakage: Border Tax Adjustments versus Rebates,
RES. FOR THE FUTURE 21–22 (2009), http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-09-02.pdf
[https://perma.cc/74MH-BKEJ]; Bernd G. Janzen, International Trade Law and the “Carbon
Leakage” Problem: Are Unilateral U.S. Import Restrictions the Solution?, 8 SUSTAINABLE
DEV. L. & POLICY 22, 26 (2008); TREVOR HOUSER ET AL., PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON.
& WORLD RES. INST., LEVELING THE CARBON PLAYING FIELD: INTERNATIONAL COMPE-
TITION AND US CLIMATE POLICY DESIGN xvi (2008), http://pdf.wri.org/leveling_the_carbon
_playing_field.pdf [https://perma.cc/6W75-JJ52].
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other suppliers to foreign markets. There is sound economic rationale for
doing this, since it removes the distortion to comparative advantage
introduced by different levels of GHG emissions regulation, making it
more likely that production will be located based on genuine comparative
advantage.86 All else being equal, economic theory indicates that this
maximizes gains from trade and the overall efficiency of the global eco-
nomy. Note, however, that this high-minded rationale may not be what
drives policymakers to adopt border measures; they are often driven by
more mercantilist conceptions of competitiveness.87 Indeed, the U.S.
Senate’s refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol was largely based on con-
cerns regarding the agreement’s impact on the competitiveness of Ameri-
can manufacturers vis-à-vis those in developing countries that were not
subjected to emissions limits under the agreement.88
The drawbacks of this approach remain significant. First, as
Nordhaus argues, border tax adjustments that seek to track the carbon
emissions embedded in imports would be an immense administrative
challenge. Unless categories of products are simply presumed to have a
specified carbon content, which would undermine any incentive for
manufacturers to reduce their emissions, the manufacturing process and
energy sources would have to be tracked and verified. Also, if the tax
adjustment is limited by the domestic carbon price or SCC embedded in
emissions regulations, it gives foreign governments little incentive to
adopt their own regulations. Their domestic manufacturers are no worse
off when exporting to countries with a border tax adjustment, and better
off when producing for the domestic market and other export markets
compared to scenarios where the government adopts an equivalent
carbon price or regulatory regime. Border tax adjustments that exceed
the domestic carbon price or SCC would lack a compelling policy ratio-
nale and likely forfeit any advantage over an across-the-board tariff
under international trade law. So, border tax adjustments are weak
strategic levers that are unlikely to move the needle much with regard
to the geopolitics of climate change mitigation. However, they could play
an important role in making domestic climate regulation more viable; they
have a fairly solid economic rationale; and they stand a greater chance
of surviving a WTO challenge than alternative forms of trade linkage.
86 Veel, supra note 85, at 752.
87 Id. at 753.
88 Id. at 753–54.
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3. International Trade Law
One potential obstacle to linking trade policy with climate change
mitigation is that most countries are constrained by their obligations
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) and World
Trade Organization (“WTO”) system. GATT Article I establishes the
most-favored nation (“MFN”) principle, under which like products im-
ported from any contracting party must be given equal treatment.89 GATT
Article II sets maximum tariff schedules. Most developed country tariffs
are at or near their GATT ceilings. Developing countries tend to have more
capacity to raise tariffs, with current rates further below their ceilings,
but they are less likely to initiate linkage between climate mitigation and
trade policy.90 GATT Article III establishes the principle of national
treatment, prohibiting discrimination between domestic and imported
goods with respect to internal taxation and regulation.91 Any measures
that violate the MFN or national treatment principles or that impose
tariffs that exceed their GATT Article II schedules must be justified
under an express exception. These include anti-dumping and countervail-
ing duties authorized under GATT Article VI, and the ten “general excep-
tions” of GATT Article XX.
a. Trade Measures Consistent with GATT Articles I, II, and III
The most straightforward way for trade linkage measures to
satisfy existing international trade law would be to craft them so as to
avoid violating the principles of MFN and national treatment and impos-
ing tariffs that exceed Article II limits. The threshold question for deter-
mining whether a border tax adjustment addressing carbon emissions
could satisfy these requirements is whether it would be deemed a border
duty on imports or an internal tax.92 As clarified by the WTO Appellate
Body in China—Auto Parts, border duties apply by virtue of the event of
importation, whereas internal taxes are triggered by an internal factor,
taking place within the customs territory.93 To be considered an internal
89 General Agreement on Tarriffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, Art. I, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [here-
inafter GATT].
90 Joost Pauwelyn, Carbon Leakage Measures and Border Tax Adjustments under WTO, in
RES. HANDBOOK ON ENV’T, HEALTH & THE WTO 16 (G. Van Calster & D. Prévost eds., 2013).
91 GATT, supra note 89, at Art. III.
92 Pauwelyn, supra note 90, at 24.
93 Appellate Body Report, China—Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, ¶ 158,
WTO Doc. WT/DS339,340,342/AB/R (adopted Aug. 31, 2009).
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tax, a carbon tax would need to be structured so as to be triggered by an
act of sale, offer for sale, distribution, or use of the imported product after
clearing customs. This would not, however, prohibit collection of internal
taxes at the moment of importation, so long as the legal trigger for the
tax is an internal event.94
Also, even if a carbon tax applied to imports were judged to be trig-
gered “by virtue of the event of importation, GATT Article II:2(a) allows
a WTO member to impose “a charge equivalent to an internal tax . . . in
respect of the like domestic product or in respect of an article from which
the imported product has been manufactured or produced”.95 Such im-
position is commonly referred to as a border tax adjustment. To be border
adjustable under this provision, a tax must be applied to products, rather
than producers.96 This distinction maps onto that between indirect taxes
like sales, value added, and excise taxes and direct taxes like payroll,
income, or corporate profit taxes. It is based on the destination principle,
which holds that products themselves should only be taxed in the country
of consumption. This enables countries to choose their own levels of
taxation while maintaining trade neutrality.97
Under these provisions, a carbon tax applied evenly to all prod-
ucts of a certain description (e.g., steel, cement), regardless of the method
of production, would clearly be border adjustable. However, a tax that
sought to account for the method of production, including the energy
intensity of the production process and the carbon intensity of the energy
used, could be considered a producer tax. Such a tax would apply to inputs,
like energy, that are not embodied in the final product. The 1970 GATT
Working Party Report on Border Tax Adjustments did not directly
address whether this sort of process tax would be border adjustable.98
The closest precedent is a 1987 GATT panel report in U.S.—Superfund,
under which the United States was allowed to apply a domestic tax on
certain chemicals to imports for which the same chemicals were used “as
materials in the manufacture or production.”99 The United States has
also imposed a domestic tax on ozone depleting compounds and applied
94 Id.
95 GATT, supra note 89, at Art. II.
96 Pauwelyn, supra note 90, at 26.
97 Id.
98 Panel Report, Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments, ¶14, WTO. Doc. L/3464
(adopted Nov. 20, 1970).
99 Panel Report, United States—Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances,
¶¶ 2.5, 5.24, WTO Doc. 34S/136 (adopted June 17, 1987).
2018] INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION 949
it to imports of products containing or produced with those chemicals,
but the WTO has never ruled on whether this border adjustment is
permissible under GATT.100
Any domestic carbon tax would likely not be imposed on final
products like steel or cement, but further upstream on carbon intensive
fuels or processes. Even if imposed downstream, it would at least need
to be sensitive to differences in inputs and processes. To be sure, reduced
steel or cement consumption due to internalization of their carbon
emissions externalities is one margin on which a carbon tax would be
expected or operate. However, much of the intended effect of a carbon tax
would be to encourage manufacturers to employ less energy intensive
production methods or rely on less carbon intensive forms of energy. A
carbon tax could not achieve these effects if it were insensitive to produc-
tion processes and inputs. While it is possible that the WTO Appellate
Body would stretch the conception of a tax applied to products to accom-
modate border adjustment of a carbon tax, this outcome cannot be pre-
dicted with any confidence.
A similar analysis would apply to applications of other forms of
domestic GHG emissions regulation to imports. As with taxes, domestic
regulations applied to products, as opposed to producers, can generally
be enforced against imports. As a practical matter, however, enforcement
of GHG emissions regulations on imports is not likely to prove viable.
Compare the Tuna—Dolphin case where the United States banned tuna
caught using a method that risked killing dolphins. A GATT panel
report, which was never adopted, found that this was an impermissible
regulation of a process, rather than the product itself.101 GHG emissions
regulations, like the Clean Power Plan in the United States go far deeper
into regulating the production process, regulating the methods of energy
generation that serve as inputs. It is hard to imagine the WTO Appellate
Body deeming these regulations of products and allowing their applica-
tion to imports. If the Appellate Body were willing to condone application
of domestic climate regulations to imports, moreover, this could effec-
tively result in a ban on imports from countries that do not adopt equiva-
lent GHG emissions regulations.
Applying a domestic cap-and-trade system to imports represents
an intermediate case between carbon taxes and regulations. The WTO
100 Pauwelyn, supra note 90, at 28.
101 Panel Report, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, ¶ 5.13, WTO Doc. DS21/R,
BISD 39S/155 (1991).
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could conceive of the obligation to hold an emissions permit as an “internal
tax or internal charge of any kind,” in which case it would be potentially
border adjustable under the same analysis as a carbon tax. Alternatively,
the cap-and-trade system could be treated as regulation, in which case
it would encounter the same difficulties discussed above.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing the MFN and national treatment
principles would clearly prohibit any differential treatment of like prod-
ucts based on their national origin. Even when reference to national
origin is not explicit, this principle can be violated. For instance, an
excise tax that Japan applied at different rates to different varieties of
distilled spirits was found to violate GATT Article III’s prohibition on the
application of internal taxes in a manner “so as to afford protection to
domestic production.”102 A tax on steel that applies different rates de-
pending on whether coal or natural gas is used to produce it could be
viewed as discriminating against steel from countries, like China, that
rely primarily on coal. This would require a showing that imported
products are inherently or historically reliant on, for example, fuels with
higher carbon content. Even if such a showing were made, moreover, the
WTO Appellate Body has tolerated internal taxes that were shown to
have a “detrimental effect on a given imported product? when it could be
“explained by factors or circumstances unrelated to the foreign origin of
the product.”103 It is likely that the Appellate Body would find associated
carbon emissions to qualify as such a factor or circumstance.
A more significant barrier is raised, however, when the carbon
emissions associated with any given import are unknown. Manufacturers
may decline to disclose their production methods in sufficient detail to
enable a reasonably accurate estimate of their GHG emissions. An alterna-
tive might be to rely on the predominant method of production in the
importing country. This is the approach adopted by the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (commonly
referred to as CERCLA or Superfund). In U.S.—Gasoline, the Appellate
Body approved of this approach, so long as the same opportunities avail-
able to domestic producers to verify practices superior to the predomi-
nant method were offered to imports.104 This proviso could prove quite
102 Appellate Body Report, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, ¶4, WTO Doc. WT/DS8
/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (adopted Nov. 1, 1996).
103 Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic—Measures Affecting the Importation and
Internal Sale of Cigarettes, ¶ 96, WTO Doc. WT/DS302/AB/R (adopted Apr. 25, 2005).
104 Panel Report, United States—Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances,
¶¶ 2.5, 5.2.4, WTO Doc. BISD 34S/136 (adopted June 17, 1987).
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burdensome, requiring importing countries to expend significant resources
in verifying the GHG emissions associated with the production processes
for imports. Moreover, an approach based on the predominant method of
production in the home market would undertax imports from countries
where prevailing production methods are more carbon intensive. There
is no precedent for relying on the predominant method of production in
other countries, and it is likely that the WTO would find such an ap-
proach discriminatory. Given the low likelihood the manufacturers would
submit to a verification regime that increased their tax burden, this would
represent a substantial barrier to carbon taxes based on emissions rates
per unit of output higher than those in the domestic market.
b. Anti-dumping Duties
GATT Article VI authorizes anti-dumping duties when “products
of one country are introduced into the commerce of another country at
less than the normal value of the products” and this “causes or threatens
material injury to an established industry in the territory of a contracting
party or materially retards the establishment of a domestic industry.”105
Relying on this provision, former French Prime Minister Dominique de
Villipen referred to “environmental dumping” to justify a carbon tax that
would apply to imports from countries that refuse to commit to binding
GHG emissions targets.106 The argument is that the price of imports from
those countries would not include the social cost of the carbon emitted
during the production process.107 Thus, any country that adopts binding
GHG emissions commitments should have the right to impose extra
tariffs to account for this difference. However, GATT Article VI clearly
indicates that the “normal price” is to be understood as the prevailing
market price of the good in the exporting country’s domestic market.108
That is, the EU could only impose anti-dumping duties on Indian exports
that are priced below Indian domestic prices for the same goods.109 If a
domestic price is unavailable, “(i) the highest comparable price for the
like product for export to any third country in the ordinary course of
105 GATT, supra note 89, at Art. VI.
106 Herve Kempf, Dominique de Villepin propose une taxe sur le CO2 des produtis importes,
LE MONDE (Nov. 13, 2006), http://www.lemonde.fr/planete/article/2006/11/13/dominque
-de-villepin-propose-une-tax-sur-le-co2-des-produits-importes_833826_3244.html.
107 Id.
108 GATT, supra note 89, at Art. VI, ¶ 1(a)–(b)(ii).
109 Pauwelyn, supra note 90, at 17–19.
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trade, or (ii) the cost of production of the product in the country of origin
plus a reasonable addition for selling cost and profit” may be substi-
tuted.110 International differences in pricing and regulation of GHG
emissions, therefore, cannot support a finding of dumping.
c. Countervailing Duties
Countervailing duties are authorized by GATT Article VI “for the
purpose of offsetting any bounty or subsidy bestowed, directly, or indi-
rectly, upon the manufacture, production or export of any merchandise.”111
Nobel laureate economist Joseph Stiglitz has proposed justifying carbon
tariffs on this basis, saying:
subsidy means that a firm does not pay the full costs of pro-
duction. Not paying the cost of damage to the environment
is a subsidy, just as not paying the full costs of workers
would be . . . other countries should prohibit the importation
of American goods produced using energy intensive technol-
ogies, or, at the very least, impose a high tax on them, to off-
set the subsidy that those goods currently are receiving.112
WTO rules define subsides more narrowly as a “financial contribution”
or “price support” that confers a benefit.113 Examples include “direct
transfers of funds,” “government revenue that is otherwise due is fore-
gone or not collected (e.g., fiscal incentives such as tax credits),” and
provision of “goods or services other than general infrastructure.”114 The
only option that could apply to Stiglitz’s argument is “government reve-
nue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected.”115 As interpreted
by the WTO Appellate Body, the benchmark determining what revenue
is “otherwise due” is the normal or standard policy within the country in
question.116 Failure to act to price or regulate GHG emissions does not
110 GATT, supra note 89, at Art. VI, ¶ 1(b)(i)–(ii).
111 Id. at ¶ 3.
112 JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, A New Agenda for Global Warming, in THE ECONOMISTS’ VOICE:
TOP ECONOMISTS TAKE ON TODAY’S PROBLEM 24 (Joseph E. Stiglitz et al. eds., 2008).
113 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Art. I ¶ 1.1, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 See Appellate Body Report, United States—Tax Treatment for Foreign Sales Corpora-
tions, ¶¶ 88–90, WTO Doc. WT/DS108/AB/RW (adopted Jan. 14, 2002). The Appellate
Body held:
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qualify as a subsidy under this interpretation, regardless of the regula-
tory policies of other countries.117 Even if failure to adequately regulate
GHG emissions were considered a subsidy, WTO rules only permit coun-
tervailing duties to offset subsidies specific to “an enterprise or industry
or group of enterprises or industries.”118
d. Article XX General Exception (g)
Measures that otherwise violate WTO rules are permitted if they
satisfy at least one of GATT Article XX’s ten general exceptions and the
Article XX chapeau. General exception (g) is the most promising candi-
date to support climate-based trade measures.119 Article XX(g) exempts
measures “relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources
if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on
domestic production or consumption.”120 Given WTO precedents holding
that clean air and stocks of non-endangered fish qualify as exhaustible
natural resources, it is likely that the earth’s atmosphere would meet
. . . a ‘financial contribution’ does not arise simply because a
government does not raise revenue which it could have raised. It is true
that, from a fiscal perspective, where a government chooses not to tax
certain income, no revenue is ‘due’ on that income. However, although
a government might, in a sense, be said to ‘forego’ revenue in this
situation, this alone gives no indication as to whether the revenue fore-
gone was ‘otherwise due.’ In other words, the mere fact that revenues
are not ‘due’ from a fiscal perspective does not determine that the
revenues are or are not ‘otherwise due’ . . . the treaty phrase ‘otherwise
due’ implies a comparison with a ‘defined, normative benchmark.’ The
purpose of this comparison is to distinguish between situations where
revenue foregone is “otherwise due” and situations where such revenue
is not “otherwise due”. . . . Such a comparison enables panels and the
Appellate Body to reach an objective conclusion, on the basis of the
rules of taxation established by a Member, by its own choice, as to
whether the contested measure involves the foregoing of revenue that
would be due in some other situation or, in the words of the SCM
Agreement, ‘otherwise due.’
117 Pauwelyn, supra note 90, at 21–22.
118 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Part I, Art. 2 ¶ 1.1, 1869
U.N.T.S. 14; Pauwelyn, supra note 90, at 22.
119 Article XX(b), which exempts measures “necessary to protect human, animal or plant
life or health,” is also raised as potentially justifying carbon duties. However, the
requirement that measures be judged “necessary” is generally viewed a more significant
hurdle than XX(g) requirement for measures “relating to” the underlying objection. See
Pauwelyn, supra note 90, at 44.
120 GATT, supra note 89, at Art. XVIII, ¶ 4(g).
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this standard as well.121 Likewise GHG emissions in other countries
clearly have impacts beyond their borders, with at least as substantial
a nexus as with depletion of the populations of migratory animals like
sea turtles. To qualify for an Article XX(g) exception then, domestic
climate legislation must relate to conservation of the earth’s atmosphere
and the import provisions must be “made effective in conjunction with
restrictions on domestic production and consumption.”122 If border mea-
sures merely internalize GHG emissions externalities in a manner
comparable to the obligations placed on domestic producers, these tests
would likely be satisfied.
The chapeau qualifies this exception with the proviso that “mea-
sures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international
trade.”123 This requirement is distinct from the MFN and national treat-
ment provisions that Article XX provides exceptions to. Instead of prohib-
iting discrimination with respect to treatment of “like products” the
chapeau focuses on “countries where the same conditions prevail.” This
has been interpreted by the WTO Appellate Body to disfavor attempts to
coerce “specific policy decisions made by foreign governments.”124 In
U.S.—Shrimp, the original U.S. ban was struck down for requiring other
countries to “adopt essentially the same policy.”125 The Appellate Body
approved a modified U.S. provision conditioning market access on “the
adoption of a program comparable in effectiveness,” finding that this
“allows for sufficient flexibility in the application of the measure so as to
avoid ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.’ ”126
In the case of GHG emissions, this would likely be read to require
any border tax adjustment to account for existing emissions regulations
in exporting countries, regardless of whether they take the same form as
those in the importing country. When countries use carbon pricing or
regulations based on a SCC, comparing across countries and evaluating
the validity of import duties would be relatively straightforward. For
121 Pauwelyn, supra note 90, at 46.
122 WTO, TECHNICAL BARRIERS AND SPS MEASUREMENTS 152 (Rudiger Wolfrum et al. eds.,
2007).
123 GATT, supra note 89, at Art. XX.
124 Id.
125 Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, ¶161, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Oct. 12, 1998).
126 Id.
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countries that adopt GHG emissions abatement measures for which the
level of effort is less transparent, however, adjusting duties to reflect
prevailing conditions would be more challenging. Nonetheless, it is likely
that the WTO would approve of border adjustments that make a genuine
good faith effort to determine the relative stringency of GHG emissions
regulations and calibrate duties accordingly.
It is also possible that the requirement to take “into consideration
different conditions which may occur” may be read in conjunction with
the UNFCCC’s principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”
to require developed countries to account for their historic role in contrib-
uting to the existing stock of GHGs in the atmosphere when seeking to
apply carbon duties to developing countries. There is no WTO precedent
on point and it is unclear whether “conditions” would be interpreted to
include past behavior related to the policy objective.127 However, this
could prove the most significant obstacle to the imposition of carbon
duties against developing countries under Article XX(g).
The Appellate Body has also interpreted the chapeau to require
“serious, across-the-board negotiations with the objective of concluding
bilateral or multilateral agreements” prior to imposition of unilateral
import measures.128 This means that any country intending to impose
carbon duties would need to demonstrate a good faith effort to negotiate
a climate mitigation agreement with any and all countries that it wishes
to apply such duties against. If carbon duties are being employed as part
of a genuine effort to achieve global cooperation on climate change
mitigation, this should not be a significant hurdle.
e. Conclusions Regarding Trade Linkage Under Current
WTO Law
The most promising avenue for justifying border carbon measures
under existing international trade law is the Article XX(g) exception.
Justifying them as countervailing or anti-dumping duties simply does not
hold up to rigorous inspection. While it may be possible to find a way to
apply domestic climate policies’ imports in a way that would not be found
to violate the MFN or national treatment principles, the strictures of
those principles would likely impose highly suboptimal design constraints.
127 Pauwelyn, supra note 90, at 50.
128 Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, ¶166, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted November 6, 1998).
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A “carbon tax” consistent with these principles would likely be forced to
set fixed rates for categories of products, regardless of their production
processes, undermining much of the policy rationale for the tax in both
its domestic and foreign application. The challenges only become more
daunting when considered a domestic cap-and-trade program or com-
mand and control regulatory scheme. So, while Article XX(g) can be cum-
bersome and the chapeau may pose particular challenges with regard to
developing countries, it is likely the most viable mechanism for trade
linkage under current law. It could probably be used to support a carbon
tariff that scales with differences in the stringency of emissions abate-
ment policies that are in place in the importing and exporting countries.
Other measures, including Nordhaus’s carbon club proposal for across
the board tariffs with a binary cutoff based on adopting a particular
domestic carbon price, would almost certainly require substantial modifi-
cations to international trade law.
4. Non-trade Issue Linkage
Although trade is the most commonly discussed and probably the
most potent and universal option for policy linkage, it is worth briefly
considering other options. After all, diplomatic negotiations between
countries span a wide range of issues; access to foreign markets is only
one concern among many. Countries are also less constrained by interna-
tional law when modifying non-trade policies. Security assistance is
sometimes codified in treaty alliances like the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, but these arrangements typically lack enforcement mecha-
nisms.129 Foreign aid, arms sales, immigration, intelligence sharing, and
joint research and development are typically discretionary or governed
by agreements that are subject to renegotiation. Most, if not all, of these
policy domains are already used to influence the behavior of other states,
both with regard to internal matters like human rights and more tradi-
tional geopolitical issues. Trade sanctions are generally reserved for
punishing bad actors when diplomatic relations have already degraded
significantly. Between countries with moderate to friendly diplomatic
relationships, this broader suite of tools of statecraft is more commonly
deployed. Sometimes policies like foreign aid and security assurances are
publicly and explicitly conditioned, but often such linkages are implicit
or expressed in non-public diplomatic communications.
129 North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243.
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To some extent, the pledge and review model relies on a sort of
implicit notion that countries that cooperate on global climate mitigation
will be rewarded in other policy domains. This is part of what people are
getting at when they warn of the consequences for the United States if
the Trump Administration cedes global leadership on climate change to
China. There is precious little indication, however, that countries expect
to experience tangible consequences for failing to make and fulfill ambi-
tious GHG emissions reduction commitments. The United States did not
appear to suffer significant diplomatic consequences for failing to ratify
the Kyoto Protocol, nor did Canada for withdrawing from it.
One way for countries to show that they take climate change
mitigation seriously is to treat it as a first-tier geopolitical issue. If a
country fails to adopt stringent emissions policies, it should fear with-
drawal of security assistance or guarantees, arms sales, and foreign aid,
where applicable. For more powerful countries like the United States,
basing rights or other similar concessions could be withdrawn. Likewise,
strong climate mitigation performers should be able to anticipate more
favorable treatment in these domains. Unlike trade, these policies are
less susceptible to codification in a systematic regime. On a less formal
basis, however, they can play an important role in nudging countries to
adopt more ambitious emissions abatement policies. Climate change
need not become the dominant determinant of any country’s foreign
policy for this to have an impact. All it requires is that countries begin
to make it known that that good climate behavior will be rewarded and
bad behavior punished and to follow through on these commitments, at
least on the margin.
5. Risks and Limitations of Issue Linkage
All the issue linkage options discussed above carry the risk of
undermining other important policy goals and breeding international
resentment, which could be counterproductive even for emissions reduc-
tions purposes. One common difficulty is setting the baseline against
which a country’s emissions path will be measured. Since there is no
consensus on how the burden of climate change mitigation should be
distributed, any formula imposed by the wealthier and more powerful
countries could produce a backlash in the developing countries it is
applied to. Shifting the framing of climate mitigation commitments from
mass-based aggregate emissions targets to a carbon price or SCC would
provide a more transparent benchmark, but such a move is itself likely
to encounter substantial resistance.
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Issue linkage strategies would also likely struggle to impose emis-
sions discipline on rich and powerful countries like the United States,
which don’t rely much on others for foreign aid or security assistance.
This concern has recently been elevated in salience and importance due
to the results of the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Indeed, in the weeks
following this election, officials in the Canadian and Mexican govern-
ments, as well as former French President and then-presidential candi-
date Nicolas Sarkozy, floated the idea of carbon tariffs against the
United States if President-elect Trump withdraws from the Paris Agree-
ment.130 Whether such retaliations will come to pass and what effect they
might have remains to be seen, however there is some reason to doubt
their coercive power and also to worry about the potential for a trade
war. The precedent that countries are only punished when they back out
of commitments might also generate a disincentive for governments to
make ambitious pledges in the future. The proper incentive structure
would require sufficient inducements for countries to make ambitious
pledges and to actually meet them, not merely refrain from officially
renouncing them. Despite these difficulties and limitations, it is worth
exploring whether linking climate change mitigation with other policy
domains can enable introduction of incentives that internalize some of
the costs imposed on the rest of the world by any one country’s GHG
emissions. Trade linkage is likely to prove the most potent option, but
other tools can play an important supporting role.
C. Globally Harmonized Carbon Pricing
A more ambitious approach would be introduction of a globally
harmonized carbon price, either in the form of a carbon tax or cap-and-
trade scheme. Once in place with adequate enforcement and verification,
this could fully internalize the costs associated with GHG emissions,
wherever they occur. The major hurdle would be getting everyone to
agree to participate on terms that are consistent with stabilizing atmo-
spheric GHG concentrations at a tolerable level. The domestic politics of
cap-and-trade and carbon taxes in the United States are likely to present
a substantial obstacle in this regard. It would also necessarily entail an
up-front agreement regarding the distribution of the burden of climate
130 Coral Davenport, Diplomats Confront New Threat to Paris Climate Pact: Donald Trump,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/19/us/politics/trump-cli
mate-change.html [https://web.archive.org/web/*/http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/19/us
/politics/trump-climate-change.html].
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change mitigation, though not necessarily the geographic location of the
emissions reductions. In the tax scenario, the key distributional variable
would be allocation of the revenues from the tax. For cap-and-trade,
allowances could be auctioned, allocated freely, or some combination. If
given freely, the burden of mitigation would be determined by that
distribution. If auctioned, it would be determined by the allocation of
revenues, as in the carbon tax scenario. In either case, it would fore-
ground the ultimate issues related to the just and practicable distribu-
tion of the burden of mitigation. Whether this should be a considered a
feature or a bug is open for debate, but these issues will have to be
addressed at some point. It is exceedingly unlikely that a decentralized
voluntary process will resolve these issues without ever confronting
them, with parties’ commitments happening to aggregate to sufficient
emissions reductions to achieve the world’s stabilization goals. The fact
that the prospects for agreement on global carbon pricing seem so dim
only underscores the depth of the broader challenge facing climate
mitigation policymakers.
Moreover, the potential for at least some states to benefit finan-
cially from participation in the carbon pricing scheme could be used to
induce them to participate. Such states would have to be allocated a
share of free allowances or tax/auction revenues that exceed the sum of
their payments into the system and the net domestic costs of their
induced emissions reductions. This could not be done for everyone, so
some states would have to be willing to shoulder significant economic
burdens to get the project going. In principle, however, there is scope for
an agreement in which all countries experience net benefits from the
scheme, when the avoided climate change impacts are considered. How-
ever, such benefits are largely irrelevant to the incentives facing poten-
tial outliers, since they would expect to reap most of these benefits even
if they refuse to participate. The international community is unlikely to
able to credibly commit to forego mitigation measures unless all states
participate. Absent such commitment, the incentives to participate are
limited mostly to potential financial rewards within the system, which
are negative sum, and states have an incentive to hold out and demand
favorable treatment for their participation. One way of restating the
problem is that the transaction costs of international bargaining may be
too high for negotiations to be successful, even though there exists an
agreement that would make all parties better off.
Another concern is that the basic incentive logic would seem to
require a bargain where those least affected by the impacts of climate
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change would have to be given the most financial incentive to participate,
which runs counter to deep notions of justice.131 Finally, the introduction
of side-payments or other forms of international redistribution of benefits
and burdens would open the door to countries holding out to maximize
bargaining leverage. This is the same stab-in-the-back concern raised by
Nordhaus in the climate club discussion.132 The risk must be weighed
against the potential for side payments or distributional adjustments to
system design features to induce cooperation that would not otherwise
be possible. It is also unclear that a refusal to entertain side-payments
could be made sufficiently credible to deter countries from holding out.
In that case, the importance of having effective tools for punishing outliers,
including those discussed in the issue linkage section above, would be
further elevated.
D. Sovereign Global Climate Authority
The alternatives discussed above and their limitations point to
one final option, infringement of national sovereignty on core issues of
global governance like climate change. While nation-states serve crucial
functions and many policy problems are best addressed at the national
or subnational level, climate change cries out for robust global gover-
nance. However, the requisite infringements on sovereignty appear
implausible. Existing international institutions lack the capacity to take
on greater powers without the consent of their member states. States
tend to jealously guard their sovereignty and have not evinced any wil-
lingness to sacrifice it for the sake of climate mitigation. However, the
nation-state has only been the dominant form of government for at most
the few centuries since the 1648 Peace of Westphalia and perhaps should
not be viewed as the final or natural structure of world politics.133 The
formation of the United States from thirteen colonies and the gradual
integration of Europe under the banner of the European Union provide
some precedent for consensual relaxation of sovereignty. When the WTO’s
adoption was debated in the early 1990s, opponents rightly claimed its
authority to issue legally binding decisions would substantially constrain
131 See generally Daniel A. Farber, Climate Justice, 110 MICH. L. REV. 985 (2012).
132 Nordhaus, supra note 61, at 1239–40.
133 Derek Croxton, The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty, 21
INT’L. HIST. REV. 569, 569 (1999); Andreas Osiander, Sovereignty, International Relations,
and the Westphalian Myth, 55 INT’L. ORG. 251, 270 (2001).
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national sovereignty.134 Yet it overcame these objections and now coun-
tries routinely submit to WTO judgments.135
More broadly, all of international law can be said to be impose
some limits on state sovereignty, with infringements expanding as
globalization presses on.136 These dynamics have led some scholars to
speak of graduated sovereignty, where the workings of global markets
compel smaller states to cede certain forms of sovereignty.137 Meanwhile,
other scholars note that “the control and authority of states have been
persistently challenged” over the course of history, since “no authority
structure [ ] can definitively choose among competing normative prescrip-
tions, including the conflict between non-intervention and various justifi-
cations for intervention in the internal affairs of other states such as the
protection of human and minority rights.”138 By this reasoning, an anar-
chic system of interstate relations is not qualitatively more conducive to
untrammeled national sovereignty than a system of robust international
law. As in the domestic context, the sovereign rights of one state inevita-
bly come into conflict with the prerogatives of another. If this is true of
domestic human rights abuses and labor practices, it is all the more true
for emissions of gases that alter the global climate.
While interest in world government among scholars and policy-
makers has waned since the end of World War II, there is a long tradition
of support for the idea dating back to Dante Alighieri in the early four-
teenth century and running through Hugo Grotius, generally considered
the father of international law, and Immanuel Kant’s Perpetual Peace.139
The notion of world government became central to public debate regarding
world affairs in the 1930s and 1940s and was endorsed by 1940 Republi-
can presidential nominee Wendell Willkie.140 Climate change mitigation
would not require full abdication of national sovereignty to a world
government, only a narrow delegation to emissions controls. For instance,
the climate authority could be authorized to levy a carbon tax, with the
134 Phillip R. Trimble, Globalization, International Institutions, and the Erosion of National
Sovereignty and Democracy, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1944, 1944 (1997).
135 Id. at 1945–46.
136 Id. at 1946.
137 Aihwa Ong, Graduated Sovereignty in South-East Asia, 17 THEORY, CULT. & SOC’Y 55,
57 (2016).
138 Stephen D. Krasner, Globalization and Sovereignty, in STATES AND SOVEREIGNTY IN
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 34 (David A. Smith et al. eds., 1999).
139 Thomas G. Weiss, What Happened to the Idea of World Government, 54 INT’L. STUD.
Q. 253, 259 (2009).
140 Id. at 260.
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tax rate and distribution of revenues determined by through its own in-
ternal governance procedures, rather than a negotiation between sovereign
states. Alternatively, a more decentralized approach, akin to cooperative
federalism in the United States, could be adopted where the global cli-
mate authority sets a minimum carbon price or national emissions caps
and national governments are given flexibility to choose the mix of policies
to meet their obligations. This would have to be backstopped by the
threat of sanctions against countries that fail to comply or direct regula-
tion by the global climate authority, analogous to denial of federal fund-
ing to states and the Environmental Protection Agency imposition of
federal implementation plans under the Clean Air Act.
It is true that in 2017 the world is currently experiencing a
backlash against globalism, but it is too early tell whether this will prove
a turning point or a mere bump in the road. We should not prematurely
rule out the possibility that the grave threat of climate change could
induce the nations of the world, or their peoples and institutions more
directly, to see and act on the need for a sovereign global authority to
address climate change mitigation. Indeed, talk of an international
climate regulatory agency dates back to negotiations over the Kyoto
Protocol in late 1990s, when UK Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott
proposed “an equivalent of interpol to police, customs and enforcement
agencies to combat” illegal trade and other violations of the carbon
dioxide emissions permitting system.141
One caveat to this analysis is that the WTO and other existing
institutions of international law lack the sort of independent enforcement
power that might be needed to effectively address climate change. In-
stead, WTO decisions are enforced by the threat of legally sanctioned
retaliation against actions that violate the GATT imposed by countries
that were already be free to engage in the same forms of retaliation
before the adoption of the GATT and WTO.142 There is no precedent for
deeper consolidation of sovereignty absent a common outside threat or
enemy. Whether climate change is too abstract and impersonal a threat
to perform this function remains to be seen. If so, perhaps a WTO-like
body (or the WTO itself) that authorizes states to punish other state
141 Henry I. Miller, Biotechnology Regulation and Foreign Policy: Eccentric Environmen-
talism Instead of Sound Science, in THE GREENING OF US FOREIGN POLICY 331, 230 (Terry
L. Anderson & Henry I. Miller eds., Hoover 2000).
142 Terry L. Anderson & J. Bishop Grewell, It Isn’t Easy Being Green: Environmental Policy
Implications for Foreign Policy, International Law, and Sovereignty, 2 CHI. J. OF INT’L.
L. 427, 435 (2001).
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climate outliers could help make the policy linkage approach discussed
above more viable by enhancing its legitimacy. The Montreal Protocol’s
non-compliance procedure, for instance, does ultimately enable suspen-
sion of specific rights and privileges to be imposed on parties that are
found in violation of the treaty and fail to rectify the situation.143
In considering this route, there is reason to fear that an authority
initially granted powers restricted to climate change mitigation will ex-
pand and undermine national sovereignty more broadly, setting itself up
as a dominant global government. The expansion of the powers of the
federal government in the United States since the 1930s provides some
basis for concern that constitutional constraints may fail to reign in such
mission creep.144 Whether emergence of a broader form of global govern-
ment is necessarily something to be feared is beyond the scope of this paper,
but the prospect is worth acknowledging. At the very least, the potential for
this government to degrade into an oppressive dictatorship with no external
rivals or possibility of escape is worthy of some trepidation. As with the
other proposals raised in this paper, however, this risk must be weighed
against the risks of failing to adequately address the climate crisis.
CONCLUSION
All of the alternatives discussed in this paper involve formidable
challenges and risks. Negotiation tools like conditional emissions reduc-
tion and issue linkage are risky and may be underpowered for the task
at hand. A global harmonized carbon price is an extremely attractive policy
goal, but there is no clear path to adopting one. A robust sovereign global
climate authority could impose the needed emissions reductions, but the
143 UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, HANDBOOK FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
TREATIES FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE OZONE LAYER 297 (6th ed. 2003), http://www.linde
-gas.com/internet.global.lindegas.global/en/images/Montreal%20protocol%20hand
book%20200317_104517.pdf?v=2.0 [https://perma.cc/LE6H-BW6L].
144 Before the 1930s, the Commerce Clause was interpreted narrowly, denying the federal
government broad powers to regulate economic activity. In the New Deal era, the Supreme
Court, in part due to political pressure from the Roosevelt Administration, reinterpreted
the Commerce Clause to uphold New Deal programs on the basis that they regulated ac-
tivities that, in aggregate, have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. This “post–New
Deal Commerce Clause doctrine reveals the inherent difficulties in limiting the scope of
federal Commerce Clause powers based upon simple tests that demarcate the proper
allocation of authority between the states and the federal government.” Maxwell L.
Stearns, The New Commerce Clause Doctrine in Game Theoretical Perspective, 60 VAND. L.
REV. 1, 8 (2007).
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path to peacefully creating one is similarly murky and carries significant
tail risk of its own. Nonetheless, it seems clear that the current volun-
tary, bottom-up approach is severely underpowered relative to the scale
of the challenge. If policymakers are serious about climate change miti-
gation, alternatives like those discussed above must be considered and
refined. The foregoing analysis does not provide final answers regarding
the proper structure of climate change mitigation institutions, but my
hope is that it can spark a conversation that moves us beyond the cur-
rent paradigm. Future work in this area, for instance, may consider the
potential for crafting international institutions that account for the role
of domestic politics in shaping climate change mitigation and producing
outcomes that deviate from the predictions of traditional international
relations theories that treat states as black boxes. My intent here is not
to disparage the great and noble efforts of those who crafted the process
that led to the Paris Agreement. Their contributions are vital and the
agreement was an important step in the right direction. However, I
remain deeply skeptical that the basic approach embodied in the agree-
ment will ultimately be capable of achieving its stated goals.
